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INTRODUCTION

Electronically stored information poses a number of problems in civil
discovery.' The sheer quantity of information, and the nature of electronic
*
J.D., summa cum laude, Michigan State University, 2008; B.S., University of
Wisconsin-Madison, 2005. Law clerk to Justice Patience D. Roggensack, Wisconsin Supreme Court (2008-09 Judicial Term). The author would like to thank Professor Craig Callen
for his invaluable insight and thoughtful feedback on earlier drafts of this paper.
1. See, e.g., Thomas Y. Allman, The Need for FederalStandards Regarding Electronic Discovery, 68 DEF. COUNS. J. 206 (2001); Kindall C. James, Electronic Discovery:
Substantially Increasing the Risk of Inadvertent Disclosure and the Costs of Privilege Review-Do the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Help?, 52
Loy. L. REv. 839 (2006); Richard L. Marcus, Confronting the Future: Coping with Discov-
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storage systems, means that such information may be automatically deleted
or modified without any intentional action by the information's owner, often necessarily so, due to the constraints of the storage system and the need
for additional storage capacity as new content is created. 2 In addition, because it can be so difficult to keep track of such information due to its quantity, the information owner may, in many cases, have no idea what that information contains or even where it is located. 3
These inherent characteristics of electronically stored information and
electronic storage systems create some difficulty when spoliation of evidence-that is, destruction of evidence relevant to litigation-is taken into
account.4 To what extent should parties be punished for the destruction of
electronic evidence whose quantity is so great, and whose content is often
necessarily subject to automatic deletion and modification due to storage
constraints, often without any affirmative act, merely because that evidence

ery of Electronic Material, 64 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253 (2001); Shira A. Sheindlin &
Jeffrey Rabkin, ElectronicDiscovery in FederalCivil Litigation:Is Rule 34 Up to the Task?,
41 B.C. L. REv. 327 (2000).
2.
Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DuKE L.J.
561, 589-90 (2000) ("The dramatic increase in discoverable material derives in part from the
technological ease with which electronically stored documents may proliferate. Electronic
documents are likely to be stored in more locations, to be distributed to a wider audience,
and to have more prior drafts retained than would paper documents. Equally important are
the mind-boggling differences in storage capacity created by electronic technology.").
3. Thomas Y. Allman, The Need for Federal Standards Regarding Electronic
Discovery, 68 DEF. CouNs. J. 206, 206 (2001) ("Take, for example, the matter of routine
inter-office communications. The use of electronic mail has increased geometrically the
number of places where 'copies' of those types of documents may be located. Instead of
merely residing in filing cabinets filled with hard copies, electronic documents may exist
both in systems designed to retain and manage such records, as well as in systems not intended for that purpose.").
4.
There is some disagreement about whether the word spoliation inherently refers
to intentional destruction of relevant evidence, or if it encompasses negligent conduct as
well. See Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Topeka, No. 06-4004-RDR, 2007 WL 1246200, at
*3 (D. Kan. Apr. 27, 2007) (defining spoliation as the "intentional or negligent destruction
or loss of tangible and relevant evidence which impairs a party's ability to prove or defend a
claim" (emphasis added)); Salvatore Joseph Bauccio, E-Discovery: Why and How E-Mail is
Changing the Way Trials Are Won and Lost, 45 DuQ. L. REv. 269, 276 (2007) (stating that
spoliation means "[t]he willful or negligent loss of relevant evidence during trial or in anticipation of litigation" (citing Zubulake v. UJBS Warburg, L.L.C., 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y.
2003)) (emphasis added)). But see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1169-70 (8th ed. 2004) (defining spoliation as "[t]he intentional destruction, mutilation, alteration, or concealment of
evidence" (citing 27 C.J.S. Discovery § 79 (1999); 31 C.J.S. Evidence §§ 163-165 (1996))
(emphasis added)). The majority of authorities have spoliation encompassing both intentional and negligent conduct, and this article accordingly makes no distinction between the
two. As such, a modifier before use of the word spoliation, indicating negligent or intentional conduct, will be used where appropriate.
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might have been relevant to a claim or defense? What culpable state of
mind should be required in this context?
In the traditional, hard copy spoliation context, "negligent" conduct
has been sufficient to support a finding of civil discovery sanctions for spoliation.5 For clarity's sake, negligent conduct in the spoliation context must
be distinguished from the common law tort of negligence. When courts talk
about "negligence" in the spoliation context, they are referring to a state of
mind, not analogizing spoliation to the negligence tort. 6 "[A] party's behavior rises to the level of negligence [in the spoliation context] when the party
is subjectively unaware that specific relevant documents are scheduled for
destruction according to the party's document retention policy and the
documents are destroyed.",7 This state of mind is one that is less culpable
than intentional or reckless conduct, yet more culpable than strict liability,8
and describes a situation where the party took steps to comply with the obligation to preserve relevant evidence, yet the steps taken9 were simply insufficient because of subjectively unintentional ignorance.
5.
Langley v. Union Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 510, 514 (7th Cir. 1997); Vodusek v.
Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148, 157 (4th Cir. 1995); Glover v. BIC Corp., 6 F.3d 1318,
1329 (9th Cir. 1993); Marrocco v. Gen. Motors Corp., 966 F.2d 220, 221-22, 224 (7th Cir.
1992); SDI Operating P'ship v. Neuwirth, 973 F.2d 652, 653-54 (8th Cir. 1992); Unigard
Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng'g & Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d 363, 368 n.2, 370 (9th Cir. 1992);
Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d 1239, 1248 (6th Cir. 1988); Lewy v. Remington Arms Co.,
836 F.2d 1104, 1112 (8th Cir. 1988); AdvantaCare Health Partners, L.P. v. Access IV, No. C
03-04496 JF, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16835, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2004); Ward v. Tex.
Steak Ltd., No. 7:03cv00596, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10575, at *8 (W.D. Va. May 27,
2004); Fischer v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 64 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 553 (D. Minn. 2004), available at
2004 WL 1088328; Rice v. United States, 917 F. Supp. 17, 21 n.5 (D.D.C. 1996); Jackson v.
Harvard Univ., 721 F. Supp. 1397, 1412 (D. Mass. 1989); Jackson v. Nissan Motor Corp.,
121 F.R.D. 311, 323 (M.D. Tenn. 1988), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom., Hall v.
Nissan Motor Corp., 888 F.2d 1391 (6th Cir. 1989); Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v.
Turnage, 115 F.R.D. 543, 557 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Barker v. Bledsoe, 85 F.R.D. 545, 547-48
(W.D. Okla. 1979); Valenstein v. Bayonne Bolt Corp., 6 F.R.D. 363, 365 (E.D.N.Y. 1946).
6.
United Med. Supply Co., Inc. v. United States, No, 03-289C, 77 Fed. Cl. 257,
266 (Fed. Cl. 2007) (discussing the spectrum of states of mind in the spoliation context,
including negligence: "On one end of th[e] spectrum... [some] courts.., require a showing
of bad faith before any form of sanction is applied .... Further relaxing the scienter requirement, some courts ... require proof of purposeful, wiilful or intentional conduct ....
On the other side of the spectrum, we find [other] courts that do not require a showing of
purposeful conduct, at all, but instead require merely that there be a showing of fault, with
the degree of fault[] ranging from mere negligence to bad faith .... ").
7.
Rena Durrant, Spoliation of Discoverable Electronic Evidence, 38 Loy. L.A. L.
REv. 1803, 1818 (2005).
8.
Id.
9.
See infra Part III.D; see also Rena Durrant, Spoliation of Discoverable Electronic Evidence, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1803, 1818 (2005) ("The most obvious example of
negligence during the course of production is when a party that is under a duty to produce
evidence attempts to find such evidence but fails in doing so. Despite good faith efforts in
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The most obvious example of negligence during the course
of production is when a party that is under a duty to produce evidence attempts to find such evidence but fails in
doing so. Despite good faith efforts in trying to procure the
missing evidence, such conduct still rises to the level of
negligence since the party was on notice that the evidence
was potentially relevant to litigation. 10
In the hard-copy context, when a showing of negligence is made,
courts have been willing to instruct the jury to infer that such evidence
would have reflected negatively on the spoliating party-known as the spoliation inference.11 A showing of negligence has also been sufficient to support imposition of more traditional monetary sanctions or a heightened burden of proof. 12 Spoliation sanctions, especially the spoliation inference, are
often fatal-and deservedly so-to the claim or defense of the party against
whom they are directed.1 3 However, the idea of negligent conduct being
sufficient to support an award of sanctions for destruction of electronically
trying to procure the missing evidence, such conduct still rises to the level of negligence
since the party was on notice that the evidence was potentially relevant to litigation.").
10.
Rena Durrant, Spoliation of DiscoverableElectronic Evidence, 38 Loy. L.A. L.
REv. 1803, 1818 (2005).
11.
See, e.g., Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148, 157 (4th Cir. 1995);
Glover v. BIC Corp., 6 F.3d 1318, 1329 (9th Cir. 1993); Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d
1239, 1248 (6th Cir. 1988); Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., 836 F.2d 1104, 1112 (8th Cir.
1988); Ward v. Tex. Steak Ltd., No. 7:03cv00596, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10575 (W.D. Va.
May 27, 2004); Rice v. United States, 917 F. Supp. 17, 21 n.5 (D.D.C. 1996); Jackson v.
Harvard Univ., 721 F. Supp. 1397, 1412 (D. Mass. 1989).
12.
See, e.g., Langley v. Union Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 510, 514 (7th Cir. 1997); Marrocco v. Gen. Motors Corp., 966 F.2d 220, 221-22, 224 (7th Cir. 1992); SDI Operating
P'ship v. Neuwirth, 973 F.2d 652, 653-54 (8th Cir. 1992); Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng'g & Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d 363, 368 n.2, 370 (9th Cir. 1992); AdvantaCare Health
Partners, L.P. v. Access IV, No. C 03-04496 JF, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16835, at *13 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 17, 2004); Fischer v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 664 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 553 (D. Minn.
2004), available at 2004 WL 1088328; Jackson v. Nissan Motor Corp., 121 F.R.D. 311, 323
(M.D. Tenn. 1988), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom., Hall v. Nissan Motor Corp.
888 F.2d 1391 (6th Cir. 1989); Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v. Turnage, 115 F.R.D.
543, 547 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Barker v. Bledsoe, 85 F.R.D. 545, 547-48 (W.D. Okla. 1979);
Valenstein v. Bayonne Bolt Corp., 6 F.R.D. 363, 365 (E.D.N.Y. 1946).
13.
T. Patrick Gumkowski, Protecting the Integrity of the Rhode Island Judicial
System and Assuring an Adequate Remedy for Victims of Spoliation: Why an Independent
Cause of Action for the Spoliation of Evidence is the Solution, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REv. 795, 811 (2005) ("Issue preclusion and dismissal with prejudice are two civil sanctions
that have been applied in both negligent and intentional spoliation situations. Because the
effects of these sanctions are so powerful though, whenever possible, courts choose to apply
lesser sanctions instead of these more fatal sanctions. When a dismissal with prejudice is
actually granted against the plaintiff, any evidence discovered after the dismissal is moot,
even if the evidence was significant and may have helped establish a prima facie case.").
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stored information is a terrifying thought for many potential litigants due to
the difficulties and exponentially increased costs associated with the storage
of such information. 14
In response to this legitimate concern, the Federal Rules of Procedure
were amended effective December 1, 2006, and Rule 37(f) was added. Rule
37(f) responds directly to parties' concerns about spoliation sanctions for
the destruction of electronically stored information.1 5 "Confusingly, the
[2007] revision to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure moved what once
was Rule 37(f) to Rule 37(e).,, 16 Thus, it will be hereinafter referred to as
Rule 37(e). The text of the rule is as follows:
(e) Failure to Provide Electronically Stored Information. Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not
impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to
provide electronically stored information lost as a result of
the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system. 17
The most important element of Rule 37(e) is the "good faith" requirement. Basically, if the destruction of electronically stored information occurs as a result of the routine operation of an electronic storage system, and
this destruction occurs in good faith, the court cannot sanction the destroying party absent exceptional circumstances.' 8 As is demonstrated below, the
good faith standard limits the imposition of spoliation sanctions for failure
to provide electronically
stored information to a showing of reckless or
9
intentional conduct.'
It should be noted that because sanctions may be imposed for the destruction of relevant evidence, courts have inferred that a duty to preserve
such evidence exists. 20 This duty plays an important role in determining
when a party's conduct may potentially subject it to spoliation sanctions.
Though many courts have held that this obligation only arises once a court

14.
See infra Part IM.A.
15.
See infra Part III.B.
16.
Disability Rights Council v. Metro. Transit Auth., 242 F.R.D. 139, 146 n.10
(D.D.C. 2007).
17.
FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e).
18.
Id.
19.
See infra Part III.C.
20.
JAMIE S. GORELICK, STEPHEN MARZEN & LAWRENCE SOLUM, DESTRUCTION OF
EVIDENCE § 2.9 (Supp. 2008) ("The notion that spoliation before trial gives rise to an adverse
inference suggests the existence of a legal duty to preserve evidence. Some courts express
this idea by stating that litigants have an affirmative duty to preserve evidence that is reasonably foreseeable to be used in a pending action.").
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order has been issued, 21 most courts have held that the duty to preserve relevant evidence arises "when the party has notice that the evidence is relevant
to litigation-most commonly when the suit has already been filed .... but
also ... when a party should have known that the evidence may be relevant
to future litigation. ' 22 Stated another way, "[s]anctions may be imposed
against a litigant who is on notice that documents and information in its
possession are relevant to litigation, or potential litigation, or are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and destroys
such documents or information. 23 In creating Rule 37(e), the Advisory
Committee and drafters clearly had the latter standard in mind, i.e., that the
obligation may arise in the absence of a court order, as the Advisory Committee Report states that "a party is under a duty to preserve information
because of pending or reasonably anticipated litigation.,,24 In any case,
disagreement about when the preservation obligation arises goes beyond the
scope of this article. The only important point that need be noted with regard to the preservation obligation is that Rule 37(e) creates a safe harbor
for parties after the preservation obligation has arisen, whether it is due to a
court order or a party's reasonable anticipation of litigation. That is, after
the preservation obligation has arisen, whenever that might be, a party will
still avoid spoliation sanctions, absent exceptional circumstances, as long as

21.
See, e.g., Frame v. S-H, Inc., 967 F.2d 194, 199, 201 (5th Cir. 1992); Marrocco
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 966 F.2d 220, 221-22, 223 (7th Cir. 1992); Helmac Prods. Corp. v.
Roth (Plastics) Corp., 814 F. Supp. 560, 570-72 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Gen. Envtl. Sci. Corp. v.
Horsfall, 141 F.R.D. 443, 448 (N.D. Ohio 1992); Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142
F.R.D. 68, 71, 73, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
22.
Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998) (emphasis added);
see also MOSAID Techs. Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 348 F. Supp. 2d 332, 336 (D.N.J.
2004); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, L.L.C., No. 02 Civ. 1243 (SAS), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18771 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Lamarca v. United States, 31 F. Supp. 2d 110, 127 (E.D.N.Y.
1998); McGinnity v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 183 F.R.D. 58, 61 (D. Conn. 1998);
Howell v. Maytag, 168 F.R.D. 502, 505 (M.D. Pa. 1996); Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines,
Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
23.
Wm.T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1443, 1455 (C.D.
Cal. 1984) (emphasis added); see also Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 959 (9th Cir.
2006); Hodge v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 360 F.3d 446, 451 (4th Cir. 2004); AdvantaCare
Health Partners, L.P., v. Access IV, No. C 03-04496 JF, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16835, at
*13 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2004); Fischer v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 64 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 553 (D.
Minn. 2004), available at 2004 WL 1088328; Arista Records, Inc. v. Sakfield Holding Co.,
314 F. Supp. 2d 27, 34 (D.D.C. 2004); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 179 F.R.D. 622,
631 (D. Utah 1998).
24.
Memorandum from the Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure to the Chief
Justice of the U.S. and Members of the Judicial Conference of the U.S. 15 (Sept. 2005),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/supct 1105/ExcerptSTReportCV.pdf (emphasis added).
25.
See infra Part III.B.
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its failure to produce electronically stored information was due to the good
faith, routine operation of its electronic information system.26
Having laid this foundation, a few problems have arisen in Rule
37(e)'s application. Despite the fact that courts should be prohibited from
imposing sanctions for spoliation of electronically stored information which
occurs after a preservation obligation has arisen, as the result of the good
faith, routine operation of a party's electronic information system, this has
not been the case. 27 Instead, courts have in some cases limited their analysis
to whether a preservation obligation has arisen at all, imposing sanctions
per se if one has, and failing to consider the extent to which a party acted in
good faith or not.28 This is tantamount to strict liability, in that the state of
mind of the spoliating party plays no role in determining whether sanctions
should be imposed. In addition, when courts have considered the state of
mind of the spoliating party, negligent conduct has been sufficient to support the imposition of sanctions, despite the fact that the rule clearly requires a reckless or intentional state of mind.2 9 As a result, concerns about
the intersection of electronically stored information and spoliation are not
being addressed, and Rule 37(e) has been rendered largely superfluous.
This article argues that courts have been too hard on parties who have
spoliated evidence in good faith, as the rule permits, in that courts have
imposed sanctions for considerably less-culpable conduct than the rule was
meant to target. Furthermore, this article argues that courts need to consider
more than just the moment when a preservation obligation arises when the
material to be preserved is electronically stored information, since Rule
37(e) clearly provides a safe harbor for parties who spoliate such information after the preservation obligation has arisen.
Part II of this article provides an overview of the meaning of "spoliation sanctions" and the state of mind that courts have generally required for
the imposition of sanctions in the hard-copy context. Part HI discusses the
problems created by electronically stored information, and discusses the
adoption of Rule 37(e) and its corresponding state of mind requirement,
namely, a showing of reckless or intentional conduct, which is intended to
address these problems. Part IV then provides an overview of recent case
law applying Rule 37(e) and demonstrates that courts have misapplied the
rule, in that they have either been too willing to impose sanctions for negligent conduct, or have limited their consideration to whether or not a preservation obligation has arisen at all when the rule clearly requires the court to
consider more. Part V discusses the merits of proper application of Rule
26.
27.
28.
29.

FED. R. Clv. P. 37(e).
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
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37(e) and provides a framework for courts to apply the rule correctly, considering all the relevant factors and the correct state of mind.
II.

A SHORT OVERVIEW OF SPOLIATION

The following section provides an overview of the spoliation sanctions
pertinent to the application of Rule 37(e). Part A discusses the types of
sanctions that courts typically have at their disposal in punishing spoliation.
Part B discusses the state of mind courts generally require in order for these
sanctions to apply. As will be shown, negligent conduct is sufficiently culpable for most courts to impose even the harshest of spoliation sanctionsthe spoliation inference. This is important to note when one considers how
best to cope with the spoliation problems created by electronically stored
information.
A.

WHAT ARE SPOLIATION SANCTIONS?

Spoliation sanctions are the measures/punishments that courts impose
upon parties for spoliating evidence.3 ° Such sanctions may take a number of
forms, from an award of attorney's fees to a default judgment in favor of
the innocent party. 31 The most commonly imposed spoliation sanction is the
spoliation inference, "'the oldest and most venerable remedy' for the spoliation of evidence. 3 2 The spoliation inference is defined as "a rule that
allows the factfinder [sic] to draw an unfavorable inference against a litigant who has destroyed documents relevant to a legal dispute." 33 Some
commentators have argued that the spoliation inference is not actually a
traditional discovery sanction, but is rather a rule of evidence. 34 However,
30.
JAMIE S. GORELICK, STEPHEN MARZEN & LAWRENCE SOLUM, DESTRUCTION OF
EVIDENCE § 3.1, at 65-66 (1989) ("Discovery sanctions are monetary and nonmonetary

penalties imposed by trial judges on a party or its counsel, typically before trial, for destruction of discoverable material the party or its counsel knew or should have known was relevant to pending, imminent, or reasonably foreseeable litigation.").
31.
Clayton L. Barker, Discovery of Electronically Stored Information, 64 J. Mo. B.
12, 18 (2008) ("The court has various types of sanctions at its disposal, including imposing
fines, attorney's fees, or costs; default; dismissal; ... witness exclusion; and fact establishment.").
32.
Michael R. Nelson & Mark H. Rosenberg, A Duty Everlasting: The Perils of
Applying TraditionalDoctrines of Spoliation to Electronic Discovery, 12 RICH. J.L. & TECH.
14 (2006), http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/vI2i4/articlel4.pdf (quoting Jonathan Judge, Comment, Reconsidering Spoliation: Common-Sense Alternatives to the Spoliation Tort, 2001
Wis. L. REV. 441,444 (2001)).
33.
EVIDENCE

JAMIE S. GORELICK, STEPHEN MARZEN & LAWRENCE SOLUM, DESTRUCTION OF

§ 2.1 (1989).

34. JAMIE S. GORELICK, STEPHEN MARZEN & LAWRENCE SOLUM, DESTRUCTION OF
EVIDENCE § 2.1, at 14 (Supp. II 2007).
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the same commentators have noted that "the distinction between the spoliation [inference] as evidence law and the imposition of discovery sanctions
may be purely theoretical. Some courts do not recognize the distinction at
all, and recent judicial opinions indicate there may be a trend toward merging or considering the two doctrines together.' ' 35 In fact, the author of this
article found in researching the issue that courts go to little, if any, effort to
distinguish the two, and consider them equally as "sanctions" available to
punish spoliators.
Nevertheless, it is worth discussing the nature of the discovery sanctions that exist separately from the spoliation inference. "A federal court
has three sources for its power to sanction breaches of the duty to preserve:
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(g), 37(b)(2), and 37(c)(1); 28 U.S.C. §
1927; and the court's inherent power." 36 Under these provisions, "[tihe
court has various types of sanctions at its disposal, including imposing
fines, attorney's fees, or costs; default; dismissal; .. .witness exclusion;
and fact establishment." 37 Any of these sanctions may operate as alternatives to the spoliation inference for courts, depending upon the circumstances. In general, however, as stated above, the most commonly utilized
"sanction" is the spoliation inference, and it is this sanction which this author will generally have in mind when "spoliation sanctions" are discussed
throughout the balance of this article.
B.

IN THE TRADITIONAL CONTEXT, NEGLIGENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO IMPOSE
SANCTIONS

In imposing sanctions, courts look to the state of mind of the spoliating
party to determine whether and to what extent a sanction is appropriate.3 8
When referring to state of mind, the scale of culpability sufficient to hold a
party responsible ranges from strict liability to reckless or intentional conduct, with negligence falling in between. 39 In imposing the spoliation inference instruction as a sanction, courts in the past generally used to require
35.
Id. § 2.1, at 15.
36.
Clayton L. Barker, Discovery of ElectronicallyStored Information, 64 J. Mo. B.
12, 18 (2008).
37.
Clayton L. Barker, Discovery of ElectronicallyStored Information, 64 J. Mo. B.

12 (2008).

38.
United Med. Supply Co., Inc. v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 257, 266 (Fed. Cl.
2007) (discussing the spectrum of states of mind in the spoliation context, including negligence: "On one end of th[e] spectrum ...[some] courts ... require a showing of bad faith
before any form of sanction is applied ....Further relaxing the scienter requirement, some
courts ... require proof of purposeful, willful or intentional conduct ....On the other side
of the spectrum, we find [other] courts that do not require a showing of purposeful conduct,
at all, but instead require merely that there be a showing of fault, with the degree of fault[]
ranging from mere negligence to bad faith .....
39.
Id.
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some form of intentional conduct. 4° In fact, in 1989, scholars noted that
most authorities were "unanimous in the judgment that some form of intent
is a prerequisite to drawing the spoliation inference."4 1 In support of this,
other sources note that the spoliation "inference arises ... only where the
act was intentional, and indicates fraud and a desire to suppress the truth,
and it does not arise where the destruction was a matter of routine with no
fraudulent intent.4 2 However, there is substantial authority to the contrary,
especially in recent case law, as several courts have held that negligent conduct is sufficient to impose an adverse inference sanction.4 3 The rationale
for imposing a sanction in this case is that "between a negligent spoliator
and an innocent victim, the spoliator should 'bear the onus of proving a fact
whose existence or nonexistence was placed in greater doubt by the negligent party."4
In imposing discovery sanctions in general, as opposed to the spoliation inference in particular, negligent conduct is widely agreed upon to be
sufficient.45 "Destruction of evidence is sanctionable when a party knows or
reasonably should know that discoverable material is relevant to pending,

40.
See, e.g., Vick v. Tex. Emp. Comm'n, 514 F.2d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1975); INA
Aviation Corp. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 695, 700 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 610 F.2d 806
(2d Cir. 1979); Universe Tankships Inc. v. United States, 388 F. Supp. 276, 286 (E.D. Pa.
1974), afftd, 528 F.2d 73 (3d Cir. 1975); Dow Chem. Co. (U.K.) v. S.S. Giovannella
D'Amico, 297 F. Supp. 699, 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
41.

JAMIE S. GORELICK, STEPHEN MARzEN & LAWRENCE SOLUM, DESTRUCTION OF

EVIDENCE § 2.8, at 40 (1989).
29 AM. JuR. 2D Evidence § 244 (2001 & Supp. 2008).
42.
Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148, 157 (4th Cir. 1995); Glover v.
43.
BIC Corp., 6 F.3d 1318, 1329 (9th Cir. 1993); Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d 1239, 1248
(6th Cir. 1988); Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., 836 F.2d 1104, 1112 (8th Cir. 1988); Ward
v. Tex. Steak Ltd., No. 7:03CV00596, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10575 (W.D. Va. May 27,
2004); Rice v. United States, 917 F. Supp. 17, 21 n.5 (D.D.C. 1996); Jackson v. Harvard
Univ., 721 F. Supp. 1397, 1412 (D. Mass. 1989).
44.
JAMiE S. GORELICK, STEPHEN MARZEN & LAWRENCE SOLUM, DESTRUCTION OF
EVIDENCE § 2.8 (1989 & Supp. H 2007) (quoting Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d 1239,
1248 (6th Cir. 1988)).
45.
See, e.g., Langley v. Union Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 510, 514 (7th Cir. 1997); Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng'g & Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d 363, 368 n.2, 370 (9th Cir.
1992); SDI Operating P'ship v. Neuwirth, 973 F.2d 652, 653-54 (8th Cir. 1992); Marrocco
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 966 F.2d 220, 221-22, 224 (7th Cir. 1992); AdvantaCare Health Partners, L.P. v. Access IV, No. C 03-04496 JF, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16835 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
17, 2004); Fischer v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 64 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 553 (D. Minn. 2004), available at 2004 WL 1088328; Jackson v. Nissan Motor Corp., 121 F.R.D. 311, 323 (M.D.
Tenn. 1988), rev'd in part on other groundssub nom., Hall v. Nissan Motor Corp., 888 F.2d
1391 (6th Cir. 1989); Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v. Turnage, 115 F.R.D. 543, 547
(N.D. Cal. 1987); Barker v. Bledsoe, 85 F.R.D. 545, 547-48 (W.D. Okla. 1979); Valenstein
v. Bayonne Bolt Corp., 6 F.R.D. 363, 365 (E.D.N.Y. 1946).
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imminent, or reasonably foreseeable litigation. '' 6 The rationale for imposing discovery sanctions for this type of less culpable conduct is that
as between the negligent destroyer of evidence and the innocent victim of destruction, the more culpable destroyer
should bear the risk that destruction has irreparably undermined the factfinding process in a particular case. (Imposing sanctions for negligent destruction of evidence also
protects against disguised willful destruction by removing
the excuse of negligence in borderline cases .... )47
As a result, the vast majority of courts have been willing to impose discovery sanctions for merely negligent spoliation.4 8
To summarize, this section has shown that for both the spoliation inference and general discovery sanctions, most courts will impose sanctions
on a party even if its conduct was merely negligent, as opposed to requiring
a showing of reckless or intentional conduct. That courts impose spoliation
sanctions for this type of less-culpable conduct is especially important when
one considers the problem for which Rule 37(e) is the solution-i.e., with
the principles of this section in mind, how can discovery problems created
by electronically stored information in the spoliation context be remedied?
That is the focus of the next section.
III.

TRADITIONAL SPOLIATION DOCTRINES CANNOT BE APPLIED TO

ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION: ENTER RULE 37(E)

This section discusses the concerns that electronically stored information creates in the spoliation context. Namely, Part A discusses the fact that
the sheer volume of information, which requires regular deletion in order to
be manageable under typical storage constraints, in combination with the
unwieldiness and high cost of long-term storage of all electronically stored
information, if necessary, mandates that such information be treated differently than traditional hard-copy evidence. Part B then discusses the adoption of Rule 37(e) and its good faith standard, highlighting how this standard is supposed to relieve parties of the serious problems created by electronically stored information in the spoliation context. Part C demonstrates
that in order for Rule 37(e) to be effective, the good faith standard requires
a showing of recklessness or intent. Finally, Part D defines the scope of
46.
EVIDENCE
47.
EVIDENCE

48.

JAMIE

S.

GORELICK, STEPHEN MARZEN & LAWRENCE SOLUM, DESTRUCTION OF

JAMIE

S.

GORELICK, STEPHEN MARZEN & LAWRENCE SOLUM, DESTRUCTION OF

§ 3.11, at 93 (1989 & Supp. 112007).
§ 3.11, at 94 (1989).

See cases cited supranote 45.
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protection provided by Rule 37(e) by discussing case law examples of protected and unprotected conduct.
A.

THE NEED FOR A RELAXED SPOLIATION STANDARD IN THE ELECTRONIC
CONTEXT

Electronically stored information is produced in massive quantities, often automatically, unlike anything ever seen in the hard copy, paper-based
context. 49 Because of the sheer quantity of information that is indiscriminately created, storage constraints necessitate that unused or old information be deleted from time to time in order to make space for new information.50 In addition, this information is often manipulated by the storage system in ways that receive little if any input from actual people. That is, much
of what is done with electronically stored information is done automatically, and often occurs without the knowledge of that information's owners. 51 Furthermore, this information, especially if stored on backup tapes, is
stored in an unorganized and unwieldy manner.5 2 As a result of these circumstances, which simply do not exist with regard to hard-copy documents,
the difficulty of a party in avoiding negligent conduct that results in the
destruction of evidence is enormous.5 3
49. Thomas Y. Allman, The Need for Federal Standards Regarding Electronic
Discovery, 68 DEF. CouNs. J. 206, 206 (2001) ("[T]he sheer volume of information available
in the electronic context is materially different [than in the traditional context]. Take, for
example, the matter of routine inter-office communications. The use of electronic mail has
increased geometrically the number of places where 'copies' of those types of documents
may be located. Instead of merely residing in filing cabinets filled with hard copies, electronic documents may exist both in systems designed to retain and manage such records, as
well as in systems not intended for that purpose.").
50.
Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the LitigationMatrix, 51 DuKE L.J.
561, 585-86 (2001) ("In institutions that produce a large volume of documents, permanent
retention of all backup tapes would quickly prove burdensome and unwieldy. Hence, most
organizations use a regularized deletion system that periodically and automatically writes
over backup tapes containing copies of documents that are no longer timely, thereby creating
space for new backup copies.").
51.
Id. at 584 ("Because they are created automatically, such [information] often
exist[s] without the knowledge of their author. When the author seeks to delete the primary
file, therefore, she is generally unaware that the deletion does not also purge the file clone.
Moreover, because the file is saved on the hard drive, rather than on a centralized network,
purging a document on the network may not purge it from the creator's hard drive.").
52.
Id. at 585 ("Because backup tapes are not organized in a manner that separates
them by designation or subject matter, retrieval of a particular document is extremely difficult. The system is designed to function only in the event of a system catastrophe or natural
disaster, in which event computer experts would be able to retrieve needed documents from
the backup tapes.").
53.
Michael R. Nelson & Mark H. Rosenberg, A Duty Everlasting: The Perils of
Applying TraditionalDoctrines of Spoliation to Electronic Discovery, 12 RICH. J.L. & TECH.
para. 5, at 4 (2006), http://aw.richmond.edu/jolt/vl2i4/articlel4.pdf. "[Tioday's litigious
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In light of this, if courts are permitted to impose sanctions for such
conduct in the electronic context, as they currently do erroneously, 54 the
costs from such requirements will become prohibitive, and at the same
time, these costs will be unavoidable due to the dangerous risk of severe
sanctions for failure to comply. 55 For example, if such conduct is sufficient
to impose sanctions, a large company who is regularly threatened with litigation will be
required to constantly review its backup tapes for documents that could, at some later point in the litigation process, be deemed relevant; and if the enterprise predicted incorrectly, it would risk imposition of severe sanctions. The
expense of such a process could easily prove prohibitive,
because it would require the devotion of an enormous and
unending number of person-hours, by knowledgeable individuals, to complete a careful review of unorganized
backup tapes. Yet the only realistic alternative to such a
burden would be a policy of total retention indefinitely-a
practice that, given the geometric increases in document
volume in the electronic age, could lead to the physical
overrunning of a company with electronic equipment and
severe retrieval burdens if and when the documents actually were needed in litigation.56
Because applying traditional spoliation doctrines renders electronic document retention prohibitively expensive, a different, more relaxed standard
for the imposition of spoliation sanctions is required. The drafters of Rule
37(e) understood the need for such a relaxed standard very well, and in their
Advisory Committee Report, they clearly acknowledged the fact that requiring parties to preserve every relevant electronic document would be

culture creates the likelihood that many corporate activities will eventually be the subject of
litigation, even if performed in the good faith belief that the activities are within the scope of
the law," and, as a result, without help from the law, there is almost nothing that they can do
to avoid sanctions for negligent spoliation. Id.
54.
See infra Part IV.B.
55.
Nelson & Rosenberg, supra note 53, para. 5, at 4. Under these circumstances,
"many corporations are faced with the Hobson's choice of either preserving vast quantities
of electronic data without any indication that the data will ever be relevant to litigation or
deleting such data while running the risk of potential spoliation sanctions." Nelson &
Rosenberg, supra note 53, para. 5, at 4.
56.
Nelson & Rosenberg, supra note 53, para. 5, at 4.
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prohibitively expensive and time-consuming, while insufficiently generating worthwhile benefits. 57
In addition, in the report of the Judicial Conference discussing Rule
37(e), the Committee recognized further problems created by electronically
stored information as it relates to parties' difficulties in preserving such
data after a preservation obligation has arisen, including the fact that electronic information systems routinely modify and delete information as a
necessary business function due to storage constraints, combined with the
fact that the suspension of such routine operations can be prohibitively burdensome and expensive.5 8 These acknowledgments by the Committee make
clear that rule drafters understood that parties cannot be expected to preserve every relevant electronic document after a preservation obligation
arises. Because of the nature of electronically stored information, sanctioning parties for conduct less culpable than recklessness or intent simply
places too great a burden on the parties. "[E]xcept in cases of willfulness, to
treat the spoliation of electronic evidence in the identical manner as spolia-

57.
Memorandum from Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Advisory Comm. on the Fed.
Rules of Civil Procedure to Hon. David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice
and
Procedure
75
(July
25,
2005),
http://www.uscourts.gov/mles/supctli05/ExcerptCV-Report.pdf
(discussing the background and purpose of the 2006 amendment creating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e))
("A data producer can warehouse large volumes of papers without affecting ongoing activities and can maintain and manage hard-copy records separately from the creation of products
or services. By contrast, electronic information is usually part of the data producer's activities, whether it be the manufacture of products or the provision of services. It can be difficult
to interrupt the routine operation of computer systems to isolate and preserve discrete parts
of the information they overwrite, delete, or update on an ongoing basis, without creating
problems for the larger system. It is unrealisticto expect parties to stop such routine operation of their computer systems as soon as they anticipate litigation.It is also undesirable; the
result would be even greater accumulation of duplicative and irrelevant data that must be
reviewed, making discovery more expensive and time-consuming." (emphasis added)).
58. Memorandum from the Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure to the Chief
Justice of the U.S. and Members of the Judicial Conference of the U.S. 14 (Sept. 2005),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/supct I105/ExcerptSTReportCV.pdf
("[A]II
electronic
information systems are designed to recycle, overwrite, and change information in routine
operation, not because of any relationship between the content of particular information and
litigation, but because they are necessary functions of regular business operations. ...
[Sluspending or interruptingthese features can be prohibitively expensive and burdensome,
again in ways that have no counterpart in managing hard-copy information. Using an example from current technology, many large organizations routinely recycle hundreds of
backup tapes every two or three weeks; placing a hold on the recycling of these tapes for
even short periods can result in hundreds of thousands of dollars of expense. Similarly, the
regular purging of e-mails or other electronic communications is necessary to prevent a
build-up of data that can overwhelm the most robust electronic information systems." (emphasis added)).
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tion of traditional evidence is to attempt to fit a square peg into a round
hole."5 9
In light of all these concerns, the Rules Committee determined that
punishing parties for culpable conduct lacking intent or willfulness would
be too strict, and a more relaxed, less-culpable standard was needed to permit parties to effectively manage the potential costs of electronic document
retention. Rule 37(e) was born. The rule's good faith standard, which requires reckless or intentional conduct, is the Rules Committee's attempt to
solve this problem. If a party is acting in good faith, and information is lost
storage system, that
as a result of the routine operation of its electronic
60
party is not supposed to be subject to sanctions.
B.

THE ADOPTION OF RULE 37(E) AND THE GOOD FAITH STANDARD

The first draft of Rule 37(e) that was made available for public notice
and comment, and which was subsequently amended in some very pertinent
ways, read as follows:
(f)
Electronically Stored Information. Unless a party violated an order in the action requiring it to preserve electronically stored information, a court may not impose sanctions under these rules on the party for failing to provide
such information if:
(1) the party took reasonablesteps to preserve the
information after it knew or should have known the
information was discoverablein the action; and
(2) the failure resulted from loss of the information
because of the routine operation of the party's
electronic information system.6'
Though there are several differences between this initial rule and the final
version of Rule 37(e), the most significant difference is the state of mind
required for a party to take advantage of the safe harbor. Under this originally proposed version of the rule, a party could only avoid sanctions if it
59. Martin H. Redish, ElectronicDiscovery and the LitigationMatrix, 51 DuKE L.J.
561,621 (2001).
FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e).
60.
Memorandum from Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Advisory Comm. on the Fed.
61.
Rules of Civil Procedure to Hon. David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U.S. (Aug. 3, 2004),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/comment2005/CVAug04.pdf (setting out the original proposed amendments before public notice and comment, including Rule 37(e) before the adoption of the "good faith" standard) (emphasis added).
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"took reasonable steps to preserve the information after it knew or should
have known the information was discoverable in the action." 2 The Advisory Committee clearly noted that this standard was "essentially a negligence test, requiring that the party seeking protection under the proposed
rule have taken reasonable steps to preserve information after it knew the
information was discoverable in the action." 63 That is, under this proposed
version of the rule, negligent conduct would still have been subject to spoliation sanctions.
In addition to the proposed version of the rule mentioned above, there
was also an alternate version of the rule in a footnote, which required a noticeably different state of mind for a party to be able to take advantage of
the safe harbor:
(f) Electronically Stored Information. A court may not
impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to
provide electronically stored information deleted or lost as
a result of the routine operation of the party's electronic information system unless:
(1) the party intentionally or recklessly failed to
preserve the information; or
(2) the party violated an order issued in the action
requiring the preservation of the information. 64
As is clear from the language of this alternate version, only intentional or
reckless destruction of relevant electronically stored information would
have been sufficient to permit a court to impose spoliation sanctions. Needless to say, there was considerable public comment about these two versions of the rule, since the final version of Rule 37(e) looks nothing like
either of them.65

62.
Memorandum from Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Advisory Comm. on the Fed.
Rules of Civil Procedure to Hon. David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice
and
Procedure
74
(July
25,
2005),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/supct1105/ExcerptCVReport.pdf (discussing comments to
the proposed 2006 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the effects of
public comment on the drafting of Rule 37(e)'s "good faith" culpability standard).
63. Id. (emphasis added).
64.
Memorandum from Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Advisory Comm. on the Fed.
Rules of Civil Procedure to Hon. David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U.S. (Aug. 3, 2004),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/comment2005/CVAug04.pdf (emphasis added).
65.
See Summary of Testimony and Comments on E-discovery Amendments 200405,
at
108-39
(n.d.),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/e-discovery/SummaryE-
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Proponents of the footnoted version of the rule (the reckless or intentional standard) argued that a standard which punished negligent conduct
would have been completely superfluous, and "urged that the text versionprecluding any protection under the rule even for negligent loss of information-provided no meaningful protection, but rather protected against conduct unlikely to be sanctioned in the first place." 66 Considering the discussion in Part II.B of this article, where it was noted that most courts are willing to impose civil discovery sanctions for spoliation based on a showing of
mere negligence, the arguments of those proponents tend to ring true. If
courts are already imposing sanctions for spoliation resulting from negligent conduct, and only completely innocent conduct would escape sanctions, then how would permitting sanctions for negligent conduct under a
rule that is supposed to provide relief from such sanctions have any effect?
The fact is, as things stood, the proposed version would have provided no
relief at all.
There was also resistance to the footnoted version of the rule, however, which precluded sanctions absent a showing of reckless or intentional
destruction of relevant evidence.67 The primary argument against such a
standard was that "[p]roving that a litigant acted intentionally or recklessly
in permitting the regular operation of an information system to continue
might prove quite difficult and require discovery and fact-finding that could
involve inquiry into difficult subjective issues. Adopting the footnote version could insulate conduct that should be subject to sanctions. 68 The drafters claimed to listen to both sides in drafting the final version of Rule
37(e), adopting a so-called "culpability standard intermediate between the
two published versions., 69 That standard is the good faith standard currently
present in the rule, reprinted here from earlier in this article, which reads as
follows:

DiscoveryComments.pdf (illustrating a record of the substantial public comment that took
place leading up to adoption of the rule).
66.
Memorandum from Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Advisory Comm. on the Fed.
Rules of Civil Procedure to Hon. David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U.S. 74 (July 25, 2005),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/supctl 105/ExcerptCVReport.pdf.
67.
Memorandum from Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Advisory Comm. on the Fed.
Rules of Civil Procedure to Hon. David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U.S. (Aug. 3, 2004),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/comment2005/CVAugO4.pdf.
68.
Memorandum from Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Advisory Comm. on the Fed.
Rules of Civil Procedure to Hon. David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U.S. 76 (July 25, 2005),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/supct I105/ExcerptCVReport.pdf.
69.
Id.
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(e) Failure to Provide Electronically Stored Information. Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not
impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to
provide electronically stored information lost as a result of
the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system.7 °
Under this version of the rule, spoliation sanctions are precluded as long as
the spoliating party acted in good faith, and the information was lost as the
result of the routine operation7" of a storage system.72 Based on this language and the Advisory Committee Reports leading up to the rule's adoption, it is clear that a state of mind more culpable than negligence is required for a party who spoliates electronically stored information. This
must be true since the drafters proposed a version of the rule which did punish negligent conduct, and that version of the rule was rejected in favor of a
more relaxed standard. In fact, the "good faith" language present in the rule
must be read to adopt an intent or recklessness standard despite the Committee's statements to the contrary. The next section demonstrates why this
is true.
C.

RULE 37(E)'S GOOD FAITH STANDARD REQUIRES A SHOWING OF
INTENTIONAL OR RECKLESS CONDUCT

Good faith is generally understood to be the absence of bad faith, 73 so
if a spoliating party can show that its actions were not in bad faith, it will
have met the state of mind standard required by Rule 37(e). Several authorities have discussed the meaning of bad faith in the spoliation context, and
though no one would disagree that it is a state of mind more culpable than
70.
FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e) (emphasis added).
71.
The "routine operation" requirement of Rule 37(e) is, in this author's opinion,
largely subsumed by the "good faith" language of the rule. Essentially, if relevant information is destroyed due to an operation that is not routine, this would tend to suggest that the
spoliating party took specific, affirmative steps to destroy such information. See id. As the
balance of this article suggests, specific, affirmative steps to destroy relevant information
constitute intentional spoliation-a situation where good faith cannot be present. See id. That
is, where information is not destroyed as the result of a routine operation, there can be no
good faith. See id. Good faith, thus, subsumes into itself the "routine operation" requirement.
For this reason, little attention is paid to the "routine operation" language of the rule, and this
article's primary focus is on the "good faith" language. See id.
72.
FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e).
73.
Gerseta Corp. v. Wessex-Campbell Silk Co., 3 F.2d 236, 238 (2d Cir. 1924)
("Good faith is fidelity and honesty, and bad faith is the opposite; and the definition of one
defines its antonym by the addition of a negative."); Stark v. Starr, 22 F. Cas. 1084, 1088
(C.C.D. Or. 1870) (No. 13,307) ("Good faith is the opposite to bad faith, and bad faith and
fraud are synonymous.").
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negligence, it is well settled that "bad faith" does in fact mean intentional or
reckless conduct 7 4-- exactly the type of spoliation that the Advisory Committee claims to have been stopping short of by adopting an "intermediate
standard., 75 For example, spoliation scholars have noted that bad faith is "a
term which... means... the spoliator destroyed evidence deliberately and
not inadvertently, 7 6 and that the spoliator had "a subjective intention to
destroy relevant documents. 77 In addition, bad faith has also been called
"the specific intent to prevent discovery. '78 Furthermore, courts have held
that where "there [is] no indication that the destruction of the items [has]
been willfully carried out ... there [is] a 'lack of bad faith.' ' 79 In support of
this, the case law on bad faith has been summarized as follows:
A party acts in bad faith when it destroys documents "for
the purpose of hiding adverse information" or "obstructing
the litigation" .... The most unequivocal form of bad faith
is "direct destruction." Direct destruction occurs when a
party intentionally destroys relevant evidence for the purpose of hiding it. A more equivocal form of bad faith is
what courts have called "willful blindness." A party engages in willful blindness when it knows that discoverable
evidence is available but nonetheless allows for its destruction. At that point, a court will find "that the reason for the
destruction was that the party knew that relevant evidence
74. It is necessary to contrast "good faith" in the spoliation context with "good
faith" in another context where the language also has a well-settled meaning, namely, the
U.C.C. context where good faith is defined as "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing." U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (2003 & Supp. 2008). The
U.C.C. definition contains both a subjective "honesty" standard, as well as an objective
"reasonableness" standard. U.C.C. § 1-201 cmt. 20 (2003). In the spoliation context, on the
other hand, case law and scholarship seem to pretty clearly limit the understanding of good
faith to the subjective state of mind of the party responsible for the destruction of relevant
evidence. See discussion infra accompanying notes 75-79.
75.
Memorandum from Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Advisory Comm. on the Fed.
Rules of Civil Procedure to Hon. David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U.S. 74-75 (July 25, 2005),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/supctl 105/ExcerpLCV-Report.pdf.
76.
JAMIE S. GORELICK, STEPHEN MARZEN & LAWRENCE SOLUM, DESTRUCTION OF

EVIDENCE § 3.11 (1989); see also Gaudette v. Panos, 852 F.2d 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1988); Huber
v. Henley, 669 F. Supp. 1474, 1476-77 (S.D. Ind. 1987); Telectron, Inc. v. Overhead Door
Corp., 116 F.R.D. 107, 131 (S.D. Fla. 1987); Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition
Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1443, 1454 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
77.

JAMIE S. GORELICK, STEPHEN MARZEN & LAWRENCE SOLUM, DESTRUCTION OF

78.

JAMIE S. GORELICK, STEPHEN MARZEN & LAWRENCE SOLUM, DESTRUCTION OF

EVIDENCE § 3.11 (1989).

EVIDENCE § 3.11 (Supp. 2008).

79.

SDI Operating P'ship v. Neuwirth, 973 F.2d 652, 653-54 (8th Cir. 1992).
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was contained in the documents and wanted to hide the adverse information, rather than
because the documents were
80
scheduled to be destroyed.,
To summarize, the legal scholarship and case law are in unanimous agreement that bad faith has a well-settled meaning, and that meaning is intentional or reckless (willfully blind) conduct.
The ordinary-meaning rule of statutory construction states that when
the party responsible for drafting the language "uses well-settled terminology ....its words are presumed to have their ordinary meaning and definition., 81 Here, the Advisory Committee has used terminology that had a
well-settled meaning in the spoliation context prior to adoption of the rule.
For the Advisory Committee to use this well-settled language, yet to intend
a different meaning, is not a sensible result, and would lead-in fact arguably already has led-to a great deal of uncertainty. In order to avoid this
problem, it is a necessary conclusion that Rule 37(e)'s well-settled language
requires reckless or intentional conduct, despite the Committee's halfhearted statements to the contrary. In fact, other statements made by the
Advisory Committee support this conclusion. For example, in the so-called
"Controversial Report," a document circulated by the Advisory Committee
calling attention to the proposed amendments, it was noted that "[t]he proposed amendment does not create a shield for a party that intentionally destroys specific information because of its relationship to litigation ....Selective loss of information is not good faith ....,8 In addition, the Advi-

sory Committee Note itself states that "[t]he good faith requirement...
means that a party is not permitted to exploit ...an information system to
thwart discovery obligations. 8 3 These statements are entirely consistent
with the idea that good faith requires some sort of reckless or intentional
conduct for the protection of the safe harbor to be withdrawn-if a party is
exploiting its system to delete information, this is tantamount to intentional
destruction. Thus, although the Advisory Committee suggested that it was
adopting an "intermediate standard," the adoption of language which already had a well-settled meaning in the spoliation context, in combination
with the Advisory Committee's own statements, leads to the inevitable con80.
Rena Durrant, Spoliation of Discoverable Electronic Evidence, 38 LoY. L.A. L.
REv. 1803, 1819 (2005).
Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63 (1997).
81.
Report of the Judicial Conference Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure
82.
app. F (Sept. 2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/supct1105/Controversial-Report.pdf
(providing a summary of the purpose behind the 2006 amendment creating Federal Rule of
accessed
at
report
may
be
The
full
Civil
Procedure
37(e)).
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf.
83. FED.R. Civ. P. 37 advisory committee's note.
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clusion that Rule 37(e)'s good faith standard requires a showing of intent or
recklessness.
D.

CLEARLY DEFINING RULE 37(E)'S SCOPE OF PROTECTION

This section delineates Rule 37(e)'s protective scope by evaluating
party conduct in actual spoliation cases decided before adoption of the rule.
Subsection 1 discusses cases where the conduct of the spoliating party was
not sufficiently culpable, in that it did not rise to the level of reckless or
intentional conduct, and thus, under the rule, would have been protected
from the imposition of sanctions. Subsection 2 discusses cases where the
conduct of the party was sufficiently culpable such that Rule 37(e)'s protection would have been withdrawn. In this second set of cases, the conduct
clearly supports a finding of reckless or intentional conduct, and as such,
there can be no finding of good faith.
1.

Conduct That Rule 37(e) Protects

Having demonstrated that negligent conduct does not constitute bad
faith for purposes of Rule 37(e), the following cases consider what exactly
"negligent conduct" means in order to determine what should be immune
from sanctions under the rule. Again, it is important to note that "negligent
conduct" does not represent courts' attempts to analogize spoliation to the
common law tort of negligence. Rather, negligent conduct in the spoliation
context is a way for courts to express the fact that a state of mind less culpable than recklessness or intent, but more culpable than strict liability, is
providing the basis for an imposition of sanctions. Prior case law in the
electronic context provides guidance for determining just what type of conduct qualifies for this label. For example, in Danis v. USN Communications, Inc.,84 the court imposed sanctions for the defendant's "failure to implement a suitable document preservation program." 85 In imposing sanctions, the court acknowledged that "[t]he evidence [did] not support a finding of willful or intentional destruction... [,] [t]here [was] no evidence that
[the defendant] personally destroyed evidence, or directed others to do soindeed, the evidence [was] to the contrary.' 86 In fact, as the court noted, the
defendant did take affirmative steps to preserve relevant evidence, such as
appointing an individual in the company to institute a document retention
program.87 However, the court found that these steps, though taken in good
faith with a subjective belief that they were sufficient, were nevertheless
84.
85.
86.
87.

Danis v. USN Commc'ns, Inc., 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 828, 828 (N.D. I11.2000).
Id. at 878.
Id. at 879.
Id. at 880.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 29

inadequate. 88 That is, they were negligent, and sanctions were, therefore,
warranted.8 9
The culpability standard the court applied in Danis was considerably
different from that required by Rule 37(e). In its opinion, the Danis court
noted that spoliation sanctions were available for "willfulness, bad faith or
fault... [where] willfulness and bad faith are associated with conduct that
is intentional or reckless." 90 The court's concept of "fault," in contrast to
bad faith, represented a level of culpability which simultaneously warranted
sanctions, yet could occur in good faith-being neither reckless nor intentional. 9 1 In applying this "fault" standard, the court held that the affirmative
steps taken by the defendant to preserve the documents demonstrated a
good faith, though inadequate effort to preserve evidence, and the mere fact
that these steps were inadequate provided a basis for sanctions. 92 Had the
standard required by Rule 37(e) been in effect at the time Danis was decided, the result would clearly have been different since "fault" is an insufficiently culpable state of mind. The defendant's good faith, though inadequate effort to preserve relevant evidence is exactly the type of negligent
conduct the rule's safe harbor protects, and sanctions would have been precluded.
Another example of this type of stricter pre-Rule 37(e) culpability
standard is seen in the MasterCardInternational,Inc. v. Moulton case,93
where the court imposed sanctions for the defendant's failure to preserve
allegedly relevant e-mail communications. Again highlighting the contrast
between the pre-Rule 37(e) and post-Rule 37(e) analyses, the court in
MasterCardheld that:
[W]e are not persuaded that defendants acted in bad faith,
that is, for the express purpose of obstructing the litigation.
They appear simply to have persevered in their normal
document retention practices ....The absence of bad faith,
however, does not protect defendants from appropriate
sanctions, since even simple negligence is a sufficiently
94
culpable state of mind to justify a finding of spoliation.
88.
Id. at 881.
89.
Id.
90.
Danis v. USN Commc'ns, Inc., 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 828, 872 (N.D. IIl. 2000)
(quoting Long v. Steepo, 213 F.3d 983, 985 (7th Cir. 2000)) (emphasis added).
91.
Id.; see also discussion supra Part III.C.
92.
Danis v. USN Commc'ns, Inc., 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 828, 879-80 (N.D. Ill.
2000).
93.
MasterCard Int'l, Inc. v. Moulton, No. 03 Civ. 3613 (VM) (MHD), 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11376, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2004).
94. Id.at *11.
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Of course, in direct contrast to this holding, Rule 37(e) explicitly stands for
the proposition that, in the electronic context, spoliation which takes place
due to "simple negligence" in the "absence of bad faith" is not sanctionable.9 5 A party must act intentionally or recklessly "for the express purpose
of obstructing the litigation," in order for sanctions to be available despite
the safe harbor.96 Thus, due to the absence of bad faith, the fact that the
defendants in MasterCard"persevered in their normal document retention
practices" 97 would have been sufficient to avoid sanctions under Rule 37(e).
In conclusion, these cases have provided some examples of the type of
conduct Rule 37(e) protects. If, in the electronic context, a party takes affirmative, though inadequate, steps to preserve relevant data, that party
should have the protection of the safe harbor, since taking those affirmative
steps is evidence that the party did not spoliate evidence intentionally or
recklessly-i.e., in bad faith. Furthermore, where there is no subjectively
intentional or reckless activity that results in the destruction of relevant
evidence, and the party is instead merely responsible for what might be
considered unreasonable conduct or poor judgment, a showing of bad faith
has not been made and Rule 37(e) will preclude sanctions. In order to further define the scope of Rule 37(e)'s protection, the next section demonstrates what type of conduct clearly does rise to the level of bad faith, being
sufficiently culpable to cause the safe harbor to be withdrawn.
2.

Conduct That Rule 37(e) Does Not Protect

The following cases present examples of the type of conduct that Rule
37(e) would not protect. In these cases, the spoliating party's conduct was
so culpable that it rose to the level of intent or recklessness, and as such,
under the rule, no showing of good faith could reasonably be made. For
example, in Kucala Entersprises v. Auto Wax Co.,98 the defendant made a
conscious decision to download a program called "Evidence Eliminator,"
after receiving a letter from the plaintiff discussing pending litigation between the two, in order to delete relevant information that might have adversely affected his defense. 99 The court described the program as follows:
Evidence Eliminator will delete or "clean" computer hard
drives of "deadly evidence" that may have been deleted by
the user, but still remains embedded in the computer's
95.
96.
97.
98.
2003).
99.

See discussion supra Part III.C.
MasterCard,2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11376, at * 11.
Id.
Kucala Enters., Ltd. v. Auto Wax Co., 56 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 487, 487 (N.D. Ill.
Id. at 488-89.
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memory: Promoted as "data destruction technology," the
software allegedly "destroys" the "unwanted data hidden in
[the hard] drives ....

."

The marketing of the software ap-

pears to be geared to internet users who download certain
web pages, pictures, and videos from the internet that may
lead to investigation by local or federal authorities or by
their employers. Once installed, a window opens up on
one's monitor prompting the user to "[c]hoose the method
that suits your policies for the secure destruction of files.
Practically, any of these options will keep you safe from
snoops."' 100
In response to downloading this software to delete evidence, the court
sanctioned the defendant because it was convinced that the defendant acted
"willfully and with the purpose of destroying discovery by purchasing and
then using Evidence Eliminator on his computer. Any reasonable person
can deduce ... [that] Evidence Eliminator is a product used to circumvent

discovery."'' 1 This willful and purposeful conduct is exactly the type of
conduct which constitutes bad faith. 0 2 In fact, downloading a computer
program to delete relevant information cannot be described as anything
other than the intentional spoliation of evidence. As such, there can be no
dispute that the Rule 37(e) safe harbor, if adopted at the time of the Kucala
decision, would have been unavailable to the defendant. The court's decision would not have been affected.
Another example where Rule 37(e)'s safe harbor would have been unavailable is in Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis,103 where the defendant was
sanctioned because it had subjective knowledge that its document deletion
policy would destroy relevant evidence, yet affirmatively permitted this
document deletion to continue without any intervention. 104 The court, in
describing this conduct, noted that the defendant's "failure to perform any
search [rose] above the level of mere negligence, and [its] willful blindness
in the context of the facts surrounding the destruction of the documents,
05
[led the court] to find that the documents were destroyed in bad faith.'
As described in Part III.C, as well as by the Wiginton court itself,' °6 willful
blindness, where the party has subjective knowledge that its document dele100. Id. at 489 (internal citations omitted).
101.
Id. at 494.
102. See discussion supra Part III.C.
103. Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, No. 02C6832, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19128, at
*1 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 27, 2003).
104.
Id. at *24-*25.

105.
106.

Id. at *25.
Id.
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tion policy will destroy relevant evidence, yet fails to intervene in the operation of that policy, constitutes sufficiently culpable conduct to rise to the
level of bad faith. In such circumstances, Rule 37(e)'s safe harbor is not
available. As a result, even if Rule 37(e) had been in effect at the time Wiginton was decided, spoliation sanctions would have been available and
warranted.
A final example of the type of conduct that remains unprotected despite Rule 37(e) is Pennar Software Corp. v. Fortune 500 Systems, Ltd.,107
where the court held that spoliation sanctions were available due to the badfaith conduct of the defendant. Specifically, in response to the filing into
court by the plaintiff of a web page constituting relevant evidence, the defendant "accused Plaintiffs counsel of manufacturing the [relevant web]
page, delet[ing] the page from its web server, delet[ing] another relevant
page two days later, and finally alter[ing] the server's log files in an attempt
to cover its tracks.' ' ° This conduct cannot be described as anything other
than intentional, and, as the above discussion of Rule 37(e)'s good faith
standard demonstrates, intentional conduct which results in the spoliation of
evidence does not occur in good faith. As a result, even if Rule 37(e) were
in force at the time of the PennarSoftware decision, the result of that case
would not have been affected.
To summarize, if a party consciously and purposefully downloads
software that targets and deletes relevant information from its storage system, bad faith is present and Rule 37(e)'s protection will be unavailable.
Second, if a party is subjectively aware that its document deletion policy
will result in the destruction of relevant evidence, and that party does not
intervene to stop this policy, its conduct is willfully blind, the party is acting in bad faith, and Rule 37(e)'s protection will be unavailable. Finally, the
intentional destruction of evidence in direct response to pending litigation
does not, under any circumstances, receive Rule 37(e)'s protection.
IV.

RECENT CASE LAW (MIs)APPLYING RULE 37(E)

Having shown that Rule 37(e) creates a safe harbor for parties who destroy electronically stored information after the duty to preserve has arisen,
and having demonstrated that reckless or intentional conduct must be
shown for the protection of the safe harbor to be withdrawn, this part focuses on the case law applying, or misapplying, the new rule since its adoption. In particular, Part A will show that there are several cases that have
completely ignored the clear implication of Rule 37(e)-namely, that it
107.
Pennar Software Corp. v. Fortune 500 Sys., Ltd., 51 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 279, 279
(N.D. Cal. 2001).

108.

Id. at 286.
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applies after the duty to preserve has arisen. Specifically, in these cases,
courts' decisions to impose sanctions have turned almost exclusively on
whether such a duty has arisen in the first place, despite the fact that an
inquiry into the good faith of the parties after this duty arises is mandated
by the rule. As such, these cases render the rule largely superfluous since an
analysis which is limited only to whether a preservation obligation has
arisen is no different from the courts' sanction analysis before adoption of
the rule.1°9 In fact, the analysis is even stricter since it arguably constitutes a
strict liability standard. Second, in Part B, in analyzing when courts do look
to the responsible party's state of mind, the application of the good faith
standard is found lacking. Specifically, though the rule is supposed to require recklessness or intent for protection to be withdrawn, courts have continued to impose sanctions for negligent conduct despite the clear meaning
implicit in the words "good faith." Finally, Part C discusses case law where
the "good faith" standard was either clearly overcome or applied "correctly," and acknowledges that even though Rule 37(e) does provide a safe
harbor, its protection is not unlimited.
A.

CASES THAT TURNED ON THE PRESERVATION OBLIGATION

Several cases have turned almost exclusively on whether the obligation to preserve had arisen, and thereby have continued to apply an essentially pre-Rule 37(e) analysis, since often, no consideration of state of mind
even takes place. When this happens, courts are applying what amounts to a
strict liability standard. The first case considered is Disability Rights Council v. Metropolitan Transit Authority,1 10 where despite the fact that "Rule
37(e) [was] inapplicable . . . because Plaintiffs [were] not seeking sanctions," the court nevertheless engaged in substantial discussion regarding
whether sanctions would have been imposed in light of Rule 37(e).1 ' DisabilityRights Council is not necessarily such a bad case by itself since there
were additional facts showing bad faith, which probably justified imposition of spoliation sanctions anyway. For example, the defendant in the case
did "not defend its failure to prevent the automatic feature from operating
during the course of th[e] litigation," and even "conceded the existence of
commercially available software that is programmed to impose a litigation
hold on a system that is otherwise programmed to delete information periodically and automatically."' 1 2 However, the real problem with Disability
Rights Council is that the court made some statements that other courts
have incorrectly relied upon in applying Rule 37(e). In that case, "the com109.
110.
111.
112.

See supra Part II.B.
242 F.R.D. 139 (D.D.C. 2007).
Id. at 146.
Id. at 146 n.8.
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plaint... was filed on March 25, 2004, [and the defendant] did nothing to
stop its email system from obliterating all emails ... until, at the earliest,
June of 2006." 113 In light of this, the court stated that it would have imposed
sanctions since "Rule [37(e)] does not exempt a party who fails to stop the
operation of a system that is obliterating information that may be discoverable in litigation." ' 14 As explained above, however, this is exactly what the
rule does provided the proper circumstances are present, i.e., good faith. 15
A party can fail to stop their information system without recklessness or
intent and still receive the protection of the rule. 1 6 It is this language, from
a case which was otherwise correctly decided, that has erroneously been
relied upon as dispositive by other courts.
For example, in Peskoff v. Faber,1 7 the court, in citing Disability
Rights Council, pointed out that once a preservation obligation arises, "[t]he
Advisory Committee comments to amended Rule 37[(e)] make it clear that
any automatic deletion feature should be turned off and a litigation hold
imposed," and held that a failure to do so could support a finding of sanctions per se. 118 This is not what the note says, however. Rather, the note
merely provides that failure to turn off an automatic deletion feature may be
one factor to consider in determining whether good faith is present, "19 and
as previous discussion indicates, if the failure to turn this feature off is not
the result of reckless or intentional conduct, a sanction cannot be imposed. 120 In Peskoff, unlike in DisabilityRights Council, the court's evaluation of whether to impose sanctions did turn exclusively on whether the
obligation to preserve had arisen, and essentially imposed a strict liability
standard.' 2' For example, the court held that "Faber's not turning the automatic deletion feature off once informed of pending litigation may serve as
a premise for additional judicial action, including a sanction, without offending amended Rule 37[(e)].' 22 However, the court failed to consider
12 3
whether this was a reckless or intentional failure as required by the rule.
If Faber did not have a subjective intent to destroy the information by failing to turn off the automatic deletion feature, then his conduct should not
have been sanctionable. The court failed to consider whether this was the
113.

114.

115.
116.
117.
Auth., 242
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.at 145.

Id. at 146.

See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part Il.C.
244 F.R.D. 54 (D.D.C. 2007) (citing Disability Rights Council v. Metro. Transit
F.R.D. 139, 146 (D.D.C. 2007)).
Id. at 60.
FED. R. Civ. P. 37 advisory committee's note.
See supra Part III.C.
Peskoff, 244 F.R.D. at 60-61.
Id. at 60.
Id.at 60-61.
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case. On the other hand, Faber's failure to turn off the automatic deletion
feature before notice of litigation was not sanctionable:
Even if the [parties'] relationship ... was degenerating at
this point, there cannot be deduced from its degeneration
any obligation . . . to shut off the automatic deletion features of the email system .... [Tihe automatic deletion features of the email system cannot
be the basis for any sanc124
tions in that period of time.
As the court states, the only determinative factor in its Rule 37(e) analysis
was when the preservation obligation arose. 125 No analysis of the defendant's state of mind-i.e., reckless or intentional conduct-with regard to
this failure took place. However, the defendant's failure to shut off the automatic deletion feature, without a showing that such failure was at least
reckless, should be insufficient, without more, to support a finding of sanctions under the rule.126 Rule 37(e) is more than just a restatement of existing
law, and certainly imposes more than a mere strict liability standard to determine whether a party's destruction of relevant documents should be
sanctioned. It provides additional protection to parties after the preservation
obligation has arisen and requires a showing of bad faith for this protection
to be withdrawn. However, the Peskoff court's understanding runs contrary
to both of these concepts.
Another case which turned exclusively on the moment when the preservation obligation arose, and failed to even mention Rule 37(e), is Oxford
House, Inc. v. City of Topeka.127 In noting that "[s]poliation of evidence
only occurs when a party has an obligation to preserve evidence in the face
of pending litigation and fails to do so," which again appears to articulate a
strict liability standard, the court nevertheless did not impose spoliation
sanctions because all document destruction had occurred before the preservation obligation arose.
In the instant case, the defendant received notice of pending litigation on August 12, 2005, with the receipt of plaintiffs' demand letter. There is no evidence on the record indicating that defendant had notice of the pending litigation
before that date. Defendant states that it deleted the electronic communications that form the basis of this discovery

124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id.
See supra Part II.B.
No. 06-4004-RDR, 2007 WL 1246200, at *1 (D. Kan. Apr. 27, 2007).
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dispute in June 2005. Therefore, it appears that the deletion
128
occurred before the duty to preserve evidence arose.
Oxford House is only mentioned here for completeness's sake, however,
since this article has no quarrel with the premise that destruction which
occurs before the preservation obligation arises is not sanctionable. Rather,
the quarrel is with the premise that destruction of evidence which occurs
after the obligation arises is per se sanctionable without a showing of bad
faith.
B.

CASES THAT MISAPPLIED THE GOOD FAITH STANDARD

The first case which illustrates courts' misunderstanding of Rule
37(e)'s good faith standard is Doe v. Norwalk Community College.129 In
that case the court, through its analysis of the Advisory Committee Note,
mischaracterized the rule's good faith requirement as coextensive with the
preservation obligation itself.
[T]he Commentary to that Rule indicates that, "[w]hen a
party is under a duty to preserve information because of
pending or reasonably anticipated litigation, intervention in
the routine operation of an information system is one aspect of what is often called a 'litigation hold."' Thus, in order to take advantage of the good faith exception, a party
needs to act affirmatively to prevent the system from destroying or altering information, even if such
destruction
130
would occur in the regular course of business.
Merely because the defendant failed to put a litigation hold in place, it
could not "take advantage of Rule 37[(e)]'s good faith exception," and the
court awarded sanctions. 131 However, as Part 1II.B clearly indicates, absent
a showing of recklessness or intent, the good faith requirement clearly protects conduct which results in the destruction of evidence after the preservation obligation has arisen. Doe thus renders the good faith requirement, and
Rule 37(e) itself, superfluous in much the same way as the cases in the previous section. If failure to put a litigation hold in place after the obligation
to preserve arises is sufficient to support a finding of sanctions per se, without a further showing that such failure was in bad faith, then there is 32no
difference between the Rule 37(e) analysis and a strict liability standard.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at *3.
248 F.R.D. 372 (D. Conn. 2007).
Id. at 378.
Id.
See discussion supra accompanying Parts IIB, III.B-C.
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In addition, there were arguably facts sufficient to support a finding
that the defendant in Doe acted in good faith, despite its failure to institute a
litigation hold. For example, though the defendant may have been somewhat ignorant regarding the preservation of data, the destruction of data was
not targeted, or, as the Advisory Committee Note to the rule indicates, utilized to "thwart" the plaintiffs efforts or to "exploit" the rule. Instead, the
data was destroyed more as a result of subjective ignorance than anything
else, which is exactly the type of conduct Rule 37(e) was meant to protect. 13 3 For example, the court cites as dispositive the fact that "the [defendant's r]egistrar ... testified . . . that she was unaware of this case until a
few days earlier and had never been asked to do a records search regarding
the case."' 134 In addition, several of the defendant's employees were simply
unaware "of any retention policies that applied to them.' 35 This is the typical situation in many companies, 136 and courts should take this type of intracompany dynamic into account when evaluating the presence of good
faith. 137 "In most cases, the people responsible for implementing records are
not privy to the firm's litigation risks," not because the company intentionally keeps them in the dark to destroy relevant information, but rather simply because the structure and management needs of the company simply do
not function effectively any other way. 138 This should have been taken into
account by the court in Doe when evaluating what this employee ignorance
actually meant. Finally, even with regard to the "scrubbing" of relevant
computer hard drives pursuant to company policy, there was a disagreement
from employees engaged in the "scrubbing" about its effect. The employees
testified that the "the correct word to use is 'imaged'-that is, [defendant's]
technology modifie[d] the structure of the hard drive, without scrubbing
it.' ' 139 These facts are more indicative of negligence than they are of the
type of intentionally destructive or reckless behavior that Rule 37(e) targets,
and at the very least, they warranted consideration from the court in properly applying the good faith standard, which simply did not occur. Certainly
in light of the discussion in Part III.D.2, it is difficult to hold that the conduct in Doe was reckless or intentional.

133.
See supra Part III.B-C.
134.
Doe, 248 F.R.D. at 378.
135.
Id. at 387 n.7.
136.
Daniel F. Bayha, Handle with Care: ProperData Storage and DisposalStrategies Provide Essential Protectionfor Law Firms and Their Clients, LEGAL MGMT., Jan.-Feb.
2008, at 42, 46.
137.
See infra Part V.
138.
Bayha, supra note 136, at 46.
139.
Doe, 248 F.R.D. at 378 n.6.
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A further example of courts' misapplication of the good faith standard
is Cache La Poudre Feeds, L.L.C. v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 140 where the court
essentially held that Rule 37(e) did not bar sanctions, even though there was
no showing of reckless or intentional conduct--exactly the type of situation
where the rule's "safe harbor" should have applied."4 In that case, even
though the court did award sanctions, it also correctly noted that "newly
enacted Rule 37[(e)] provides limited protection against sanctions where a
party fails to provide electronically stored information lost as a result of the
routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system." 142 However, despite this acknowledgment of the rule's purpose, the court in Land
O'Lakes nevertheless awarded sanctions even though the plaintiff did "not
establish[] that [the d]efendants intentionally destroyed electronically stored
143
information to deprive [the p]laintiff of discoverable information."'
Rather, the court found sanctions were sufficiently warranted because the
defendant had not done enough, in that it had only "directed employees to
produce all relevant information, and then relied upon those same employees to exercise their discretion in determining what specific information to
save. [The defendant's attorneys] simply accepted whatever 'documents
or
44
information might be produced by Land O'Lakes employees."1
As discussed in Part UfI.D. 1, however, when the party responsible for
destruction takes affirmative, though inadequate, steps to preserve relevant
information, bad faith is not present. In fact, the circumstances in Land
O'Lakes mirror the facts present in the Danis case, where the court imposed
sanctions because the defendant's affirmative measures, undertaken in good
faith, were simply insufficient.1 45 However, Rule 37(e) was adopted in the
years between the Danis and the Land O'Lakes decisions, and accordingly,
should have affected the outcome in Land O'Lakes. Per Danis, the conduct
in Land O'Lakes did not rise to the level of bad faith, and thus should have
been protected by Rule 37(e) since the defendant was trying to comply, and
simply did not do a good enough job.146 The defendant was not intentionally or recklessly deleting the information; rather, it was relying in good
faith on the actions of its employees. Thus, the court's analysis in Land
O'Lakes essentially ignored the intended effect of Rule 37(e)'s safe harbor.
In light of the cases discussed in Part III.D, it is very difficult to characterize the conduct in either Land O'Lakes or Doe as intentional or reck140.
244 F.R.D. 614 (D. Colo. 2007).
141.
See discussion supra Part III.C-D.
142.
Land O'Lakes, 244 F.R.D. at 628 n.13.
143.
Id. at 629.
144.
Id.
145.
Danis v. USN Commc'ns Inc., No. 98C-7482, 2000 WL 1694325, at *1, *40
(N.D. Ill.
Oct. 23, 2000).
146.
See discussion supra Part III.C-D.
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less-i.e., the type of bad-faith conduct Rule 37(e) requires for the safe
harbor to be withdrawn. Furthermore, the defendant in Land O'Lakes went
considerably further than the defendants in Disability Rights Council,
Peskoff, and Doe did, in that it "established a litigation hold shortly after the
lawsuit commenced and communicated that fact to Land O'Lakes employees who were believed to possess relevant materials."' 147 This type of effort
and lack of bad faith should have been recognized, and the sanctions in
Land O'Lakes should have been precluded by Rule 37(e).
C.

CLEAR CASES UNAFFECTED BY RULE 37(E)

There are of course cases which have been properly unaffected by the
rule, typically because the conduct of the defendant was so blatantly intentional as to leave no question that sanctions should be imposed. One such
case is In re Krause,148 where the court held that because the defendant installed software specifically designed to delete information on his data storage device after he was on notice of pending litigation, his actions failed
under Rule 37(e) since the conduct involved intentional destruction of information. 149 This is exactly the type of conduct that should still be punished under Rule 37(e), 150 and in many ways mirrors the conduct of the
defendant in the Kucala case discussed in Part HI.D.2, where the defendant
had installed the "Evidence Eliminator" program that targeted and deleted
relevant information in direct response to pending litigation. 51 In Kucala,
the court held that installation of such a program constituted intentional
spoliation of evidence,' 52 and in the same way, the defendant's behavior in
Krause was also intentional, and the conduct in both cases was, therefore,
in bad faith. When bad faith is present, Rule 37(e)'s protection is naturally
unavailable. It makes sense, of course, that there will be cases like Krause,
since, as Part Im.D demonstrates, this article is not arguing that every defendant who fails to provide electronically stored information should go
unpunished, just that defendants should get more relief than courts have
been willing to provide.
Only one court has arguably applied Rule 37(e) correctly and found
that the defendant deserved the benefit of the rule's "safe harbor." However, this case is not dispositive on the issue as there were grounds independent of Rule 37(e) that permitted the defendant to avoid sanctions. In
147.
Land O'Lakes, 244 F.R.D. at 630.
148.
In re Krause, 367 B.R. 740 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2007).
149.
Id. at 766-69.
150.
See discussion supra Part III.C.
151.
Kucala Enters., Ltd. v. Auto Wax Co., No. 02C-1403, 2003 WL 21230605, at
*1-'2 (N.D. I11.
May 27, 2003).
152.
Id. at *5.
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Escobar v. City of Houston,153 the court held that the destruction of police
records related to a shooting did not mandate spoliation sanctions because
[t]he plaintiffs d[id] not point to specific evidence in the re-

cord demonstrating . ..that information relevant [to the

case] was being destroyed because of the feature of the
computer system's routine operation ....
The plaintiffs [did] not ma[k]e a showing that the...

destruction of ... electronic communications was done in

bad faith. Without evidence that the information was relevant or was destroyed in bad faith, this154court cannot impose
the severe sanction the plaintiffs seek.
Thus, the court did determine that there was a lack of bad faith and
protected the party's conduct as required by Rule 37(e). To state that
Escobar is a proper application of Rule 37(e) is still problematic, however,
since in that case, the plaintiff had requested an "adverse-inference instruction." 155 In the Fifth Circuit, where Escobar was decided; "an adverseinference instruction[] requires a showing of bad faith" independent of Rule
37(e). 156 Thus, even though the court mentions Rule 37(e) when electing
not to invoke spoliation sanctions because the defendant's actions were not
in bad faith, it is nevertheless nearly certain that the court would not have
mandated spoliation sanctions even if Rule 37(e) did not exist since a bad
faith showing was required independent of Rule 37(e) anyway. In conclusion, despite the fact that Escobar might suggest some courts are properly
applying Rule 37(e), it is not dispositive on the issue, and the weight of
authority actually suggests otherwise.
V.

A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR PROPER APPLICATION OF RULE

37(E)

As has already been shown, spoliation resulting from negligent conduct is sufficient to impose discovery sanctions in the traditional hard-copy
context. 57 In addition, it was also shown that Rule 37(e) is supposed to
require reckless or intentional conduct in order for sanctions to be available
in the electronic context. 58 As Part IV showed, however, courts have failed
153.

29, 2007).
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Escobar v. City of Houston, No. 04-1945, 2007 WL 2900581 (S.D. Tex. Sept.
Id. at *19.
Id. at *17.
Id.
See discussion supra Part II.B.
See discussion supra Part III.C.
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to implement this mandate. The result is that the pre-Rule 37(e) status quo
still exists, and the same concerns that resulted in the adoption of the rule in
the first place remain. 159 The Supreme Court and Congress passed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that specifically contained
Rule 37(e) and its good faith standard, thus this rule should either be honored by the courts or repealed, and not left on the books and rendered superfluous, which is what has happened.
In order to solve this problem, this section discusses a proposed framework that respects the as-intended application of Rule 37(e), honoring the
good faith standard, and thereby ensuring that parties will be provided with
the benefit of the safe harbor. The most important consideration when
evaluating the factors outlined here, and which courts must always keep in
mind when evaluating conduct, is that reckless, willful, or intentional conduct is required to support a finding of bad faith under the rule.16 ° With this
in mind, the Advisory Committee Note already outlines some of the factors
that may aid in this determination. For example, the note points out that
"[g]ood faith in the routine operation of an information system may involve
a party's intervention to modify or suspend certain features of that routine
operation to prevent the loss of information.' 1 6 1 The permissive language
used by the Committee is an indication that although this factor is very important, it is one factor among several and should not by itself be dispositive, especially if such a failure to intervene was not reckless or inten162
tional.
A second factor set forth by the Advisory Committee Note has to do
with how clearly that party is aware of its preservation obligation. "Among
the factors that bear on a party's good faith ... are the steps the party took
to comply with a court order... or party agreement requiring preservation
of specific electronically stored information. 163 Thus, in a case where the
party has an agreement or court order requiring the preservation of specific
information, and the charged party fails to do so, this might indicate the
presence of bad faith. Again, however, a party can take affirmative steps to
preserve the specific information designated by the court order or party
agreement, yet still fail to adequately do so without intent or recklessness,
as in Danis,164 and this would not be grounds for a sanction since bad faith
requiresrecklessness or intent. 165
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
Ill. Oct. 23,
165.

See supra Part IH.A for a discussion of these concerns.
See discussion supra Part III.C.
FED. R. Civ. P. 37 advisory committee's note (emphasis added).
See discussion supra Part III.C.
FED. R. Civ. P. 37 advisory committee's note.
Danis v. USN Commc'ns Inc., No. 98C-7482, 2000 WL 1694325, at *40 (N.D.
2000); see also discussion supraPart IH.D.2.
See discussion supra Part III.C.
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In addition to these factors outlined in the Advisory Committee Note,
all of which take on a different tenor when the appropriate state of mind
(good faith) is taken into account, another factor that courts should consider
is the natural structure of most large companies who utilize a great deal of
electronic storage. Typically, at such entities, attorneys in the litigation department will have very little interaction with the individuals who control
the electronic storage system itself.166 As one expert in this field noted just
this year, "[in most cases, the people responsible for implementing records
are not privy to the firm's litigation risks," so in many cases, those people
may be very inexperienced or underinformed when it comes to implementing an effective preservation plan when the preservation duty arises.167 This
situation does not arise in order to avoid spoliation sanctions, but rather is
the practical result of necessary organizational structuring. 168 As such, under a standard that requires reckless or intentional conduct in order to impose sanctions, courts should be more focused on the state of mind behind
the steps that such organizations take, rather than whether they were 100%
effective or not.
Though this concern about organizational structure is not explicitly
addressed in the Advisory Committee Notes which accompany the rule, the
Committee was nevertheless aware of it and did consider it to some extent
in drafting the rule. Specifically, the originally proposed version of the rule
made use of the language "routine operation of the party's electronic information system."' 169 The revised version of the rule replaced use of the
language "the party's electronic information system" with "an electronic
information system."'' 70 As stated by the Committee, the rationale for this
change was that
in many cases, a party's electronically stored information is
actually stored on a system owned by another, such as a
vendor in a contractual relationship with the party. Absent
this change, the rule could result in holding a party subject
to sanctions for the loss of information resulting from the
routine, good-faith operation of a computer system because
166.
Daniel F. Bayha, Handle with Care: ProperData Storage and Disposal Strategies Provide EssentialProtectionfor Law Firms and Their Clients, LEGAL MGMT., Jan.-Feb.
2008, at 42, 46.
167.
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Memorandum from Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Advisory Comm. on the Fed.
Rules of Civil Procedure, to Hon. David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 27, 2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/CV5-2005.pdf
(emphasis added).
170.
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the information was on a system operated by a vendor or
other entity.' 7
In a large corporation, where the legal department is almost invariably separated from the electronic storage department, the company may very well
operate in the same manner as if the "electronically stored information is
actually stored on a system owned by another."'' 72 For this reason, courts
should provide special latitude, as required by the language of the rule and
the good faith standard, to large organizations whose information storage
departments consist of individuals who, though not trained in document
retention in the legal discovery context, nevertheless make a good faith,
though ultimately ineffective, effort to preserve such data.
In summary, the Rule 37(e) analysis should consist of the following
factors which, when considered in light of the good faithrecklessness/intent-requirement, can assist courts in determining whether
the safe harbor should shield them from sanctions: (1) a party's intervention
in its own electronic information system to modify or suspend automatic
deletion, (2) the extent to which a party has attempted to comply with a
court order or discovery agreement, and (3) the organizational structure of
the entity accused of wrongful spoliation. Failure to comply under the first
two factors should still be excused if such failure was not reckless or intentional since the rule's good faith requirement is meant to protect such conduct. The third factor should aid courts as well, since the primary rationale
for adoption of the rule in the first place was to protect those organizations
who have great difficulty retaining specific documents, yet who still
take
73
good faith, though inadequate, steps to preserve relevant evidence. 1
Having laid this framework, this article will now apply it to one of the
cases that was discussed and incorrectly decided in Part IV.B, Cache La
Poudre Feeds, L.L. C. v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., a trademark infringement case
where Land O'Lakes was accused of failing to properly monitor the discovery process, resulting in the loss of relevant evidence. 74 Under the first
prong, the extent to which the defendant intervened in the operation of its
electronic information system, it was specifically shown that Land O'Lakes
"established a litigation hold shortly after the lawsuit commenced and
communicated that fact to Land O'Lakes employees who were believed to
possess relevant materials."'' 75 The second prong is irrelevant since Land
O'Lakes commenced its attempts to preserve information in the absence of
171.
Id.
172.
Id.
173.
Id.
174.
Cache La Poudre Feeds, L.L.C. v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614 (D.
Colo. 2007).
175.
Id. at 630.
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a court order or discovery agreement. 176 Under the third prong, Land
O'Lakes was a large corporation, and as was apparent from the court's
opinion, its legal department was quite separate from the department responsible for electronic storage.177 In spite of this, Land O'Lakes made a
good-faith effort to retain relevant information, which the court found insufficient, but which can hardly be called reckless or intentional. Specifically, the court took issue with the fact that "Land O'Lakes directed employees to produce all relevant information, and then relied upon those
same employees to exercise their discretion in determining what specific
information to save.... [C]ounsel simply accepted whatever documents or
information might be produced by Land O'Lakes employees."'' 78 The court
found this reliance on the discretion of the employees unreasonable, and to
be sure, it probably was, but it did not rise to the level of bad faith required
by Rule 37(e). In support of this conclusion, the court specifically held that
the plaintiff did "not establish[] that [the d]efendants intentionally destroyed electronically stored information to deprive [the p]laintiff of discoverable information." 179 Rather, the court sanctioned Land O'Lakes because it was "less than thorough in discharging [its] duty to implement ade' 180
quate steps to insure that discoverable information would be preserved."
The fact is, a party can be "less than thorough," yet still act in good faith, 181
and based on Land O'Lakes's immediate implementation of a litigation
hold, large and separate corporate structure, and otherwise subjectively
unintentional failure to preserve every relevant document, the court should
have reached the opposite conclusion under Rule 37(e) which, if correctly
applied, should have protected Land O'Lakes from sanctions.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This article has provided an overview of the spoliation of electronically stored information and evaluated the 2006 amendment to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure that created Rule 37(e). Rule 37(e) provides a safe
harbor to parties who destroy electronically stored information relevant to a
claim or defense so long as such destruction occurs in good faith, as the
176.
Id.
177.
Id. at 624-25 (discussing Land O'Lakes's legal department and management
efforts to direct individuals to preserve data, but also showing the lack of any actual handson participation in such preservation by those elements in the organization, not due to bad
faith, but merely due to the large number of widely dispersed individuals responsible for
potentially relevant data to one degree or another).
178.
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179.
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180.
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181.
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result of the routine operation of an electronic storage system. This article
examined the adoption of the rule, and determined that the good faith standard requires a showing of reckless or intentional conduct for sanctions to
be available.I8 2 However, courts have not applied this standard as intended.
In the first place, some courts have continued to impose sanctions without
regard for the rule at all, basing their determination to impose sanctions
almost exclusively on whether a preservation obligation has arisen, running
contrary to the rule's intended application, which evaluates conduct after
such obligation arises. 183 In the second place, other courts have not given
the rule's good faith standard the teeth that the Rules Advisory Committee
intended it to have in that they have continued to impose sanctions for negligence, instead of limiting sanctions to situations where the conduct is either reckless or intentional, as the rule actually requires.184 Thus, the safe
harbor inherent in Rule 37(e) has been rendered largely superfluous.
In addressing these concerns, this article reiterated the important policy goals that adoption of the rule was meant to implement. Specifically,
because of the completely different nature of electronically stored information, as compared to traditional hard-copy evidence, applying traditional
spoliation doctrines in the electronic context makes compliance with preservation obligations prohibitively expensive and burdensome. As such, this
article pointed out the importance of the rule's good faith standard which
provides a safe harbor for such parties, making compliance more feasible
and cost-effective, and recognizing and solving the problems that the different characteristics of electronically stored information create.
Since courts' application of Rule 37(e) has rendered the rule largely
ineffective, this article attempted to remedy this situation by providing a
framework for proper application of the rule, especially focusing on the
good faith standard and its requirement of reckless or intentional conduct in
order for the protection of the safe harbor to be withdrawn. In doing so, this
framework focused on a party's intervention in document destruction, compliance with court orders and discovery agreements, and acknowledgment
of the difficulties in compliance created by the structure of large organizations. In conducting this analysis, however, the most important factor remains the good-faith conduct of the party, which informs a court's consideration of each of the other factors. Proper application of this framework
should render Rule 37(e) properly effective as intended by the Rules Advisory Committee.
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